Unemployment duration of spouses: Evidence from France by Marcassa, Stefania
Unemployment duration of spouses: Evidence from
France
Stefania Marcassa
To cite this version:
Stefania Marcassa. Unemployment duration of spouses: Evidence from France. PSE Working
Papers n2011-17. 2011. <halshs-00589546>
HAL Id: halshs-00589546
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00589546
Submitted on 29 Apr 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
  
 
 
 
 
 WORKING PAPER N° 2011 - 17 
 
 
 
Unemployment duration of spouses: 
 
Evidence from France 
 
 
 
 
Stefania Marcassa 
 
 
 
 
 JEL Codes: J12, J64 
 Keywords: unemployment duration, hazard models, labor 
earnings, marriage, France 
  
 
 
PARIS-JOURDAN SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES 
48, BD JOURDAN – E.N.S. – 75014 PARIS 
TÉL. : 33(0) 1 43 13 63 00   –   FAX : 33 (0) 1 43 13 63 10 
www.pse.ens.fr 
 
 
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA  RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE – ECOLE DES HAUTES ETUDES EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 
ÉCOLE DES PONTS PARISTECH – ECOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE – INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE AGRONOMIQUE 
 
Unemployment Duration of Spouses:
Evidence From France
STEFANIA MARCASSA ∗
Abstract
This paper presents the results of an econometric analysis of the condi-
tional probability of leaving unemployment for four waves of French married
men and women entering unemployment from 1991 to 2002. The effect of
spouse’s hourly earnings on unemployment duration is found to be asymmet-
ric for men and women. In particular, an elasticity of 0.38 for men and -0.15
for women are found to be significant for the entire sample. Individual data
from the French Labor Force Survey are used with accurate information on
spell durations, and labor earnings of the spouses. Parametric estimation tech-
niques are used.
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1 Introduction
The increasing level of unemployment both in Europe and in the U.S. is cause of
output, income losses, and social costs. It is then important to understand the pro-
cess that generates a certain level of unemployment. This process can be considered
in terms of the probability of an individual entering unemployment, and the prob-
ability of an individual leaving unemployment. These probabilities vary with the
characteristics of the individuals. In this paper, I will focus on the determinants of
unemployment durations of married individuals.
The literature on job search provides numerous studies on the effect of wealth,
unemployment benefit, and other characteristics on unemployment duration.1 One
important point in these studies is that agents are assumed to be acting individually.
But in a society where more than 60% of the agents are married or live in couples, it
is important to consider how the individual’s decisions depend on the characteristics
of the partner.
We know that among the reasons that lead to marriage (or any other form of
partnership), there is the possibility of sharing economic and social resources.2 In
particular, marriage is seen as a sort of small insurance pool against life’s uncer-
tainties, reducing the spouses’ need to protect themselves from unexpected events.
Hence, during a period of unemployment, we could expect that the effort exerted to
find a job by a married individual would depend on the spouse’s income (other than
on individual and local characteristics).
In this paper, I focus on French married men and women, and I find a significant
elasticity of unemployment duration to spouse’s earnings. But the effect is found to
be asymmetric for men and women. In particular, an elasticity of 0.38 for men and -
0.15 for women are found to be significant for the entire sample. In other words, while
unemployment duration of married women increases with the husbands’ earnings,
the unemployment duration of married men decreases with wives’ earnings. The
1There exists a vast literature on the relationship between unemployment duration and wealth,
or unemployment benefit. An example is the seminal paper of Meyer (1990) who studies the
individual behavior during the weeks just prior to the end of the unemployment insurance, and shows
the negative effect of higher unemployment benefits on the probability of leaving unemployment.
Danforth (1979) and Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001) shows that high levels of wealth result in
lower probability of leaving unemployment, and higher reservation wages. Related works are from
Lentz and Tranas (2005) and Lentz (2009) who have estimated empirically the optimal savings and
job-search behavior of a risk averse worker as she moves back and forth between employment and
unemployment, in order to determine the optimal unemployment benefit policy. A general study
on the determinants of individual unemployment durations in Britain is provided by Arulampalam
and Stewart (1995).
2An example is Waite (1995).
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econometric analysis is carried out with data from the French Labor Force Survey
from 1991 to 2002.
This paper can be thought of as an empirical application of the first pioneering
work on joint job-search by Burdett (1978) and the most recent work of Bulent, Guve-
nen, and Violante (2010). In the latter, the joint job-search and location problem of a
couple who perfectly pools income is studied. They characterize the reservation wage
behavior of the couple and compare it to the single-agent search model. They show
that, in an environment where both spouses are risk averse, a dual searcher couple
accepts job offers quickly (even quicker than a single agent). Once a worker-searcher
couple, they become more choosy in accepting offers since the income pooling plays
an insurance role. In my empirical analysis, I take spouse’s earnings (and hence,
spouse’s employment status) as exogenous. However, as discussed in Bulent, Gu-
venen, and Violante (2010), the unemployment status of a spouse may affect the
employment status of the partner. To control for this source of endogeneity, I in-
strument for spouse’s earnings using the industrial sectors in which the spouse is
currently working.
The results in this paper are partially in contrast with those of Arulampalam and
Stewart (1995), where they examine the determinants of unemployment durations
in Britain for two cohorts of men, 1978 and 1987. They find no significant marital
status effect in the younger cohort, while I show that French married men have a
significant higher probability of leaving unemployment than singles in all of the years
included in the study. Moreover, they do not find a significant elasticity to wife’s
earnings.
I also provide evidence of the fact that the sub-sample of married men with
children reacts differently to wives’ earnings than those who are childless.3 While
fathers’ behavior is comparable to those of mothers, childless married men exit faster
unemployment the higher the earnings of the wives. This can be related to the study
of Solaz (2005), where she shows that when one of the two spouses is unemployed,
the allocation of time devoted to household chores may change, and domestic tasks
are organized according to a new, adjusted, specialization which is probably tem-
porary. She focuses on the French case and tests the hypothesis of substitutability
between partners. In particular, she compares different explanations of domestic
work division during unemployment, whereby a person is forced by circumstances
to perform additional domestic tasks. The paper shows that the employed partner
does transfer to the unemployed partner some of the time (s)he devotes to domestic
tasks. The tasks performed mainly by women are the most transferable: working
partners transfer part of their share to the other partner if the latter loses his/her
3No difference is found for women.
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job. In contrast, unemployment does not reduce, and may even increase in the case
of men, participation in mixed tasks. Hence, the reallocation of time towards the
unemployed partner may affect her/his effort in searching for a job.
The approach followed here will be of an explorative nature. The impact of
spousal’s labor income on the hazard rate will be estimated using a reduced form
approach. The data used are in the French Labor Force Survey. This paper is
organized as follows. The description of the data is in Section 2. Next, in Section
3, I specify the empirical strategy. The results are presented in Section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2 Data Description
The data used are from the Enqueˆte Emploi, the French Labor Force Survey. Con-
ducted by the INSEE (National institute of statistics and economics) since 1950, the
Labor Force Survey is a longitudinal panel survey used to measure unemployment
in the sense of the ILO (International Labor Organization).
In March of every year until 2002, members of around 65,000 French households
are interviewed. One third of the household sample is renewed each year, such that
a given individual is interviewed in three consecutive years. I use the data of those
who entered in the survey in 1991, 1994, 1997, and 2000. Since 2003, the Labor
Force Survey has been quarterly and the data has been collected from a sample of
households on an ongoing basis each week in the course of the quarter. I do not
include these later years in the analysis.
The survey provides information on the professions, on the activity of women and
young people, working hours and casual employment. Moreover, extensive informa-
tion is collected on the labor market behavior of individual respondents in the year
preceding the moment of the interview. The respondents are asked to report the
main labor market state4 they were in, for each month in that year, including the
month of the interview. Some measurement errors may arise as a respondent who
has worked less than 50% of the time in a month, may declare to be unemployed
for the entire month. Also, a respondent may declare to be unemployed even if he
is not registered as such at the public employment agency (Agence nationale pour
l’emploi). By comparing individual labor market states of consecutive months in the
4Respondents are asked to choose one among the following states: (1) employed for an unlim-
ited period; (2) on his own or helping a family member in her activity; (3) fixed-term contracts,
temporary job, training, seasonal work; (4) Vocational Training, or another paid internship (5)
unemployed; (6) student, or unpaid internship; (7) military; (8) retired, early retirement, out of
business, housewife, other.
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periods from March 1990 to March 1993, March 1994 to March 1996, March 1997
to March 1999, and March 2000 to March 2002, individual unemployment durations
can be constructed as a number of calendar months. Personal characteristics of the
respondents are recorded at the first interview.
The initial and final number of individuals for the survey years used in the analysis
are in Table 1. I select men and women older than 14 and younger than 60 years old,
who are married or live in couple, and who reported inflow into unemployment at
least once during the observation period form March 1990 to March 2002. I create
an inflow sample of unemployment durations for spouses (husbands and wives) with
available information on spouse’s labor earnings and other characteristics. I only
include spells starting within the mentioned period to avoid problems related to left
censored observations.
The resulting unbalanced panel of four waves consists of 2,022 husbands and 3,616
wives. The former experience 2,091 unemployment spells, and the latter experience
3,175 unemployment spells. The maximum number of unemployment spells is 7 for
men and 9 for women. These data are in Table 2.
At each interview, the respondents describe their labor market history of the
past 12 months. Consider the following case. Two answers are available on the labor
market state of March 1991 as the same question is asked retrospectively in the
survey of 1992. Most of the studies that use the French Labor Force Survey data5
discuss the the existence of recall errors. I assume that if two answers on the labor
market state in March differ, then the retrospective answer is incorrect and the most
recent one is correct.
From the first interview in March 1991, March 1994, March 1997, and March 2000,
I select a set of demographic characteristics that are assumed to be time-constant
over the three years in which the individuals are followed. The labor earnings of the
spouses are computed as the mean of the deflated hourly wages earned over the years
in which the data are available6.
The wage of the wives is about 93% of that of husbands, evidence of a rather low
gender wage gap in the samples. The set of characteristics contains indicator variables
for living in the North, Center or South of France, having the French nationality,
5See Lollivier (1994), Magnac (1994), and van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2001) for an
extensive discussion.
6The hourly labor earnings of the spouses are computed from the monthly salary that includes
non-monthly premiums, and divided by the usual hours worked in a month. In the cases in which the
hourly wage is not higher than the minimum legal wage of that year, the hourly wage considered
is the latter. See Table 5 for details on the minimum legal hourly wage, or salaire minimum
interprofessionnel de croissance (SMIC). In the empirical analysis, I consider the logarithm of the
hourly wage.
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and being the owner of the house. The majority of the sample lives in the Northern
and Center part of France, has French nationality, and about half of the households
owns the real estate where the interview took place. This latter variable is the only
available information on the wealth of the household. I also include the age at first
interview, number of children (less than 18, 6, or 3 years old), and the number of
years spent in school.
For the profession, I construct four categories (upper and lower managers, salaried
and skilled workers), and include dummy variables for them. I also include dummy
variables to control for the duration of unemployment spells of the spouse. More
than 60% of unemployed women have husbands that have not been unemployed in
the time lag considered. If they were, the unemployment duration was less than six
months. The percentage of unemployed men married to never unemployed women
is slightly lower (50%), but as above, the average unemployment duration was less
than six months. In both samples, about half of the unemployed are registered to the
national unemployment agency. Moreover, I distinguish two categories depending on
the labor market state before entering unemployment: (1) inflow after permanent
or temporary employment; (2) inflow after being a student, in the military or after
any other non participation state. Men are mainly entering unemployment after a
permanent job; women are mostly moving out from a state of inactivity. The regional
unemployment rate is included as the average of the regional unemployment rate over
the three years. The summary statistics are in Table 3 and 4.
3 Specification of the Hazard Function
I use the framework of a duration model to analyze exit from unemployment. In
the French Labor Survey, job searchers are observed only once per month. For
this reason, following Kiefer (1988) and Kuhn and Skuterud (2004), I develop and
estimate a discrete time hazard model.
Suppose that there are i = 1, ..., N individuals who each enters unemployment at
time t = 1. The observation continues until time ti, at which point either an event
occurs or the observation is censored. Suppose Ti is a discrete random variable giving
the uncensored time of event occurrence. The conditional hazard function h(t, xi)
for person i given covariates xi is given by
h(t, xi) = Pr(Ti = t|Ti ≥ t, xi) for t = 1, 2, 3, ... (1)
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The exit rate to employment is specified as follows
Pr(Ti = t|Ti ≥ t, xi) = F (γt + x′iβt) (2)
where F is the cdf (normal or logistic). To introduce state dependence of h(t, xi), I
specify
γt = γ0 + γ1(log t) (3)
Let T ∗ be the maximum spell observed in the data. Then, such a model amounts
to a sequence of T ∗ binary choice models for the surviving populations at each t. In
particular, for t = 1:
Pr(Ti = 1|Ti ≥ 1, xi) = Pr(y1i = 1|δ1i = 1, xi) = F (γ1 + x′iβ1) (4)
where y1i = 1(Ti = 1) and δ1i = 1(Ti ≥ 1). And so on for t = 2, 3, etc.
The likelihood function for a sample of entrants can be written as:
logL =
N∑
i=1
T ∗∑
t=1
δti{yti logF (γt + x′iβt) + (1− yti) log[1− F (γt + x′iβt)]} (5)
This log likelihood function has the same basic structure of the log likelihood function
for a binary regression model in which yti is the dependent variable and in which the
data structure has been reorganized from having one record per spell to having one
record for each discrete time period that a unit is at risk of experiencing an event or
transition.
The results of the estimation are in Table 7 and 8. I present estimation results
based on F having a logistic distribution in Model (1) and (2). In Model (3), I present
estimation results based on a normal distribution for F . Moreover, in Model (4), I
present parameters estimated from Model (2) with normal unobserved heterogeneity.
A possible problem with these specifications regards the endogeneity of spouse’s
wage. We could think that the couples are not randomly matched: the choice of a
husband (wife) does depends on his (her) level of earnings and other characteristics,
or that the husband’s (wife’s) earnings insure the unemployed spouse and affects
her (his) reservation wage. In this case, the previous estimates upward bias the
coefficient on the spouse’s earnings.
To address this issue, I consider a set of instrumental variables that affect spouse’s
hourly earnings but are not correlated with her (his) spouse variation in possibility
to exit unemployment, that is the industrial sector in which the spouse works. More-
over, the husband’s (wife’s) industrial sector should not be affected by unobserved
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information about his wife’s (her husband’s) job finding prospects.
To support the choice of this instrumental variable, I refer to Dickens and Katz
(1987a) and Saunders and Marsden (1981). They provide evidence of large differences
in wages across industries for seemingly similar jobs both in the US and in Europe.
From a methodological point of view, as Kuhn and Skuterud (2002) point out,
there is no widely-used technique for estimating a duration model with an endogenous
variable. Here, I use a probit specification to model the correlation between the error
term and unobserved characteristics that induce unemployed husbands or wives to
look for job. To incorporate endogeneity in the model, I rewrite (2) as follows:
log
[
h(t, xi)
1− h(t, xi)
]
= γt + x
′
iβt + w
′
iαt + ui (6)
where wi (previously included in xi) is the hourly earning of agent’s i spouse, with
coefficient αt, and ui is the error term. Moreover, wi is defined as follows:
wi = z
′
iλt + vi (7)
where zi is a vector of exogenous, non-time varying covariates xi, plus an instrumental
variable excluded from xi. The error term (ui, vi) follows a bivariate normal distri-
bution, which implies that also the conditional distribution of u given v is normal as
follows:
u|v, z ∼ N(ρv, 1− ρ2) (8)
Hence
Pr(Ti = t|Ti ≥ t, xi, zi) = Pr(γt + x′iβt + w′iαt + ui ≥ 0|vi, zi) (9)
= Φ
(
γt + x
′
iβt + w
′
iαt + ρvi√
1− ρ2
)
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The log likelihood function can be written as
logL =
N∑
i=1
T ∗∑
t=1
δti
{
yti log Φ
(
γt + x
′
iβt + w
′
iαt + ρvi√
1− ρ2
)
(10)
+ (1− yti) log
[
1− Φ
(
γt + x
′
iβt + w
′
iαt + ρvi√
1− ρ2
)]}
+
N∑
i=1
(
−1
2
log σ2vi −
1
2
v2i
)
Under exogeneity (ρ = 0), this log likelihood function would be the sum of a probit
and an ordinary least square log likelihood function.
4 Results and Discussion
The results presented in this section focus on married individuals. Only in Table 6, I
present the marginal effects of the estimation of Model (4) applied to all individuals,
i.e. of any marital status, of age older than 14 and younger than 60. It shows that
married men have a significant higher probability of leaving unemployment than
unmarried men. On the contrary, married women have a significant lower probability
of leaving unemployment than unmarried women.
Non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival functions for married men
and women are plotted in Figure 1. As expected, the probability of remaining un-
employed is higher for women than for men.
In Figure 2, I report estimates of the Kaplan-Meier survival functions by wage
of the spouse. In particular, in the top panel, left figure, we can see the survival
function for men whose wives’ wage belongs to the bottom 1% of the distribution.
On the right figure, we can see the survival function for men whose wives’ wage
belongs to the top 1% of the distribution. On the bottom panel, the same functions
are plotted for women, depending on their husbands’ wage.
Focusing on the left figures, we can observe that the probability of surviving in
the risk pool (i.e. to remain unemployed) is similar for men and women when the
spouse’s wage is low. Moving to the right figures, we see that it is higher for women
with high wage husbands than for husbands with high wage wives. Hence, a first
look at the data shows evidence of the asymmetric behavior of unemployed married
men and women towards their spouses’ labor earnings.
Results from maximizing the likelihood in equation 5 are presented in Table 7
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for men and in Table 8 for women.7 The coefficients represent the effect of the
corresponding variables on the probability that a given individual enter employment
during the time period considered.8 Note that the sample of men and women are
not the opposite sides of an accounting relationship. The spouses of the men in the
sample are not necessarily in the sample of the women, and vice versa. The marginal
effects are in Table 10.
In comparing Table 7 and Table 8, the first result to point out is that the coef-
ficients on the logarithm of spouses’ wage are significant and of different signs. In
particular, a 100% increase in wife’s hourly earnings increases the monthly probabil-
ity of leaving unemployment by about 52 percentage points (from the most complete
Model (4), Table 10). For women, a 100% increase in husband’s hourly earnings
decreases the monthly probability of leaving unemployment by about 32 percentage
points. The baseline monthly hazards for men and women are plotted in Figure 8.
The baseline hazards are scaled to the characteristics of a “average” individual, as
in the summary statistics in Tables 3 and 4. The main feature of these plots is that
the baseline hazard in the sample of women lies entirely below that of the men.
Now, consider the effect of the rest of the variables included in the analysis. The
estimated coefficient on dummy for inflow after employment indicates that individu-
als who entered unemployment or inactivity after being employed have significantly
higher chances of leaving unemployment. As shown by most of the existing literature,
the registration to the ANPE (or receiving the unemployment benefit) decreases the
probability of exiting unemployment. The local unemployment rate is not found to
be significant (in all of the specifications for men, and in most of the specifications
for women).
The demographic explanatory variables in the model have the expected signs and
are mostly statistically significant. In both tables, age and the presence of children
decrease the chances of leaving unemployment.
Figure 3 and 4 plot the predicted probabilities from the estimation of Model (2).
In Figure 3, the probabilities are computed for three age groups of individuals9, and
the rest of the regressors are taken at their mean values. In both of the panels of
this figure, younger agents have a higher probability of finding a job, regardless of
the spouse’s earnings. But, in the right panel, the probability of finding a job is an
increasing function of the wife’s earnings, regardless of the age. In the left panel,
7The results are robust to the estimation of the pooled sample of married men and women. The
coefficients and the marginal effects are in Table 11 and Table 12, respectively.
8A positive coefficient resulting from the estimations, indicates that the variable in question
increases the hazard rate, i.e. that it decreases expected unemployment duration.
9Note that, the age of respondent could be interpreted as a proxy for the length of the marriage.
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the probability of finding a job is a decreasing function of the husband’s earnings,
regardless of the age.10
Figure 4 plots the effect of the presence (or absence) of children younger than
three years old on the probability of leaving the risk pool of unemployed. The
feature of this figure is that the probability of leaving unemployment for men depends
only slightly on the presence of children (from the slight change in intercept). For
women the presence of children strongly negatively affects the chances of leaving
unemployment.
I continue the analysis of the effects of the presence (or absence) of children in
Figures 5 and 6. They plot the predicted probabilities computed from the estimation
of Model (4) for the sample of married men (women) without and with children (left
and right panel). Figure 5 shows that, once we consider the two samples separately,
the effect of having children does not only change the intercept of the estimated func-
tion, but also the slope. In particular, regardless of the age, men without children
react differently to the earnings of wives than men with children. One possible expla-
nation could be related to the reallocation of time during unemployment, as studied
in Solaz (2005). Men with young children exit slower unemployment as wive’s earn-
ings increase because they allocate time to child care rather than job search and they
use wive’s income as buffer. Hence, conditional on having children, wive’s earnings
play the standard role of buffer against income shock (due to unemployment). On
the contrary, childless men’s self-esteem of being supported (positively) affects the
effort they exert in finding a job.
In Table 9, I present results of an alternative specification to corroborate a causal
effect interpretation of the main results. I instrument for hourly wage of the spouse
using a set of dummies for the industrial sector in which the spouse is employed
(or she/he had been employed before the last unemployment spell started). Dickens
and Katz (1987b) and Krueger and Summers (1987) present evidence of the correla-
tion between wages and industrial sectors. Moreover, the variation in this measure
essentially derives from the same source as the measure of hourly earnings, that is
changes in demand for workers in a given industry. Hence, we would expect similar
results based on the two measures. The coefficients are presented in Table 9, and
the marginal effects are in the last column of Table 10.
10The same asymmetric relationship between probability to employment and earnings is shown
in Figure 7. In these figures, I distinguish between individuals registered to the national agency
for the employment (and hence, receiving unemployment benefit), and those who are not regis-
tered (and hence, not receiving unemployment benefits). Moreover, the figures confirm the fact
showed in previous literature that receiving unemployment benefit decreases the chances of exiting
unemployment for both men and women. The difference is particularly noticeable for men.
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Results confirm a significant positive elasticity of 0.38 of unemployment duration
of married men to their wives’ hourly earnings, and a significant negative elasticity
of -0.26 of unemployment duration of married women to their husbands’ hourly
earnings.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I provide empirical evidence of the existing asymmetry in the proba-
bility of leaving unemployment of French married men and women. I show that the
results are robust when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity of
the explanatory variables.
Understanding the origin of this gender difference may be interesting to design
unemployment insurance schemes that take into account the labor market situation
of the spouse, other than of demographic characteristics.
Most of the literature on household economics studies the intra-household be-
havior of husbands and wives, and the different incentives schemes that lead them
to participate or not in the labor market. A vast literature is dedicated to the con-
sequences of fertility choices, or exogenous differences in the labor market, on the
labor market choices of married women.
Not too much space has been dedicated so far to develop models where labor
market frictions generate asymmetric reactions of married men and women, as the
ones we observe empirically.
12
A Figures
Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates
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Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates by Wage of Spouse
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Figure 3: Estimation Results - Women and Men
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Figure 4: Estimation Results - Women and Men
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Figure 5: Men Without and With Children Less than 3 yrs old
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Figure 6: Women Without and With Children Less than 3 yrs old
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Figure 7: Estimation Results - Women and Men
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Figure 8: Baseline Hazard - Women and Men
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B Tables
Table 1: Survey Years and No. of Observations After Restrictions
Survey Year No. Initial Obs. No. Final Obs. No. Husbands No. Wives
1991 137,298 823 359 769
1992 141,053 817 278 539
1993 146,803 746 293 453
1994 151,590 1,026 332 694
1995 151,146 844 330 514
1996 150,365 963 368 595
1997 148,891 1,214 389 825
1998 149,132 731 251 480
1999 182,155 697 237 460
2000 182,066 1,197 379 818
2001 178,143 708 204 504
2002 175,939 757 240 517
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Table 2: Transition from Unemployment to Employment
HUSBANDS Total Mean Min Median Max
no. of subjects 2022
no. of records 3660 1.81 1 2 8
(first) entry time 0 0 0 0
(final) exit rate 20.15 1 21 37
subjects with gap 1220
time on gap if gap 5496 3.53 1 1 33
time at risk 35241 17.43 1 12 36
total failures 2091 1.03 0 1 7
WIVES
no. of subjects 3616
no. of records 7168 1.98 1 2 11
(first) entry time 0 0 0 0
(final) exit rate 23.50 1 27 37
subjects with gap 2484
time on gap if gap 10204 2.97 1 1 26
time at risk 74775 20.68 1 20 36
total failures 3175 0.88 0 1 9
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Table 3: Summary Statistics - Husbands - Panel 1991 to 2002
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Wives’ hourly wage 6.76 (4.42) 4.98 98.03 3660
Age 40.60 (10.66) 19 57 3660
Years of education 10.43 (3.32) 5 17 3289
Number of children:
less than 3 yrs old 0.12 (0.34) 0 2 3660
less than 6 yrs old 0.27 (0.54) 0 3 3660
less than 18 yrs old 0.84 (1.01) 0 6 3660
Region of residence:
North 0.48 (0.50) 0 1 3660
Center 0.35 (0.48) 0 1 3660
South 0.17 (0.38) 0 1 3660
French nationality 0.92 (0.28) 0 1 3660
Non-French nationality 0.08 (0.28) 0 1 3660
Spouse never unemployed 0.51 (0.5) 0 1 3660
Spouse unemployed:
less than 6 months 0.25 (0.43) 0 1 3660
between 7 and 12 months 0.07 (0.25) 0 1 3660
between 13 and 18 months 0.08 (0.28) 0 1 3660
between 19 and 24 months 0.05 (0.21) 0 1 3660
25 and 30 months 0.04 (0.2) 0 1 3660
more than 31 months 0.005 (0.07) 0 1 3660
Owner of real estate 0.53 (0.50) 0 1 3660
Renter 0.46 (0.50) 0 1 3660
Upper manager 0.00 (0.06) 0 1 3497
Lower manager 0.10 (0.30) 0 1 3497
Salaried worker 0.18 (0.38) 0 1 3497
Skilled worker 0.72 (0.45) 0 1 3497
Regional unemployment rate 9.42 (2.03) 5.03 15.32 3660
Registered to the ANPE 0.52 (0.5) 0 1 3660
Inflow after permanent employment 0.36 (0.48) 0 1 3660
Inflow after temporary employment 0.21 (0.41) 0 1 3660
Inflow after being a student/military 0.00 (0.05) 0 1 3660
Inflow after any other inactivity state 0.43 (0.49) 0 1 3660
1991-1993 930
1994-1996 1030
1997-1999 877
2000-2002 823
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Table 4: Summary Statistics - Wives - Panel 1991 to 2002
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Husbands’ hourly wage 7.24 (3.77) 4.98 128.41 7168
Age 34.92 (9.15) 18 57 7168
Years of education 10.71 (3.18) 5 17 6523
Number of children:
less than 3 yrs old 0.24 (0.45) 0 3 7168
less than 6 yrs old 0.47 (0.69) 0 4 7168
less than 18 yrs old 1.17 (1.09) 0 9 7168
Region of residence:
North 0.46 (0.5) 0 1 7168
Center 0.37 (0.48) 0 1 7168
South 0.16 (0.37) 0 1 7168
French nationality 0.95 (0.22) 0 1 7168
Non-French nationality 0.05 (0.22) 0 1 7168
Spouse never unemployed 0.61 (0.49) 0 1 7168
Spouse unemployed:
for less than 6 months 0.28 (0.45) 0 1 7168
between 7 and 12 months 0.05 (0.21) 0 1 7168
between 13 and 18 months 0.04 (0.21) 0 1 7168
between 19 and 24 months 0.02 (0.12) 0 1 7168
between 25 and 30 months 0.01 (0.09) 0 1 7168
more than 31 months 0.00 (0.03) 0 1 7168
Owner of real estate 0.49 (0.50) 0 1 7168
Renter 0.51 (0.50) 0 1 7168
Upper manager 0.00 (0.05) 0 1 7076
Lower manager 0.04 (0.19) 0 1 7076
Salaried worker 0.11 (0.31) 0 1 7076
Skilled worker 0.85 (0.35) 0 1 7076
Regional unemployment rate 9.37 (2.02) 5.03 15.32 7176
Registered to the ANPE 0.48 (0.5) 0 1 7176
Inflow after permanent employment 0.26 (0.44) 0 1 7168
Inflow after temporary employment 0.24 (0.43) 0 1 7168
Inflow after being a student/military 0.00 (0.05) 0 1 7168
Inflow after any other inactivity state 0.50 (0.50) 0 1 7168
1991-1993 1761
1994-1996 1803
1997-1999 1765
2000-2002 1839
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Table 5: Salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance (SMIC)
Year Amount in euros of hourly gross SMIC
1991 4.98
1992 5.19
1993 5.31
1994 5.42
1995 5.64
1996 5.78
1997 6.01
1998 6.13
1999 6.21
2000 6.41
2001 6.67
2002 6.83
Source: INSEE
Table 6: Marginal Effects - Marital Status (1 = Married)
(4)
Men 0.271***
(0.059)
Women -0.257***
(0.072)
Controls YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table 7: Husbands, Coefficients - The dependent variable is Employment
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Logit Logit Probit Logit u.h.
Wives’ log(hourly wage) 0.097*** 0.261** 0.155*** 0.518***
(0.029) (0.039) (0.023) (0.163)
Age -0.019*** -0.012*** -0.044***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.005)
Years of education 0.018*** 0.010*** 0.079***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.014)
No. of children less than 3 yrs old -0.138*** -0.080*** -0.943***
(0.029) (0.016) (0.111)
Region of residence: North 0.027 0.012 -0.008
(0.025) (0.015) (0.139)
Region of residence: Center 0.247*** 0.143*** 0.174
(0.028) (0.017) (0.162)
French nationality 0.089*** 0.058*** -0.091
(0.031) (0.018) (0.165)
Owner of real estate 0.331*** 0.199*** 0.449***
(0.019) (0.012) (0.099)
Lower manager -0.545*** -0.335*** -3.403***
(0.159) (0.090) (0.456)
Salaried worker -0.559*** -0.339*** -1.536***
(0.031) (0.018) (0.124)
Skilled worker -0.318*** -0.189*** -2.114***
(0.023) (0.013) (0.086)
Regional unemployment rate 0.003 0.001 -0.006
(0.005) (0.003) (0.029)
Registered to the ANPE -0.620*** -0.366*** -0.467***
(0.019) (0.011) (0.063)
Inflow after employment 1.250*** 0.752*** 1.656***
(0.020) (0.012) (0.049)
Spouse’s unemployment duration NO YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Panel fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Log likelihood -54939.753 -45308.072 -45271.303 -14262.094
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Wives, Coefficients - The dependent variable is Employment
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Logit Logit Probit Logit u.h.
Husbands’ log(hourly wage) -0.056*** -0.333*** -0.199*** -0.317*
(0.018) (0.024) (0.014) (0.181)
Age -0.013*** -0.008*** -0.018***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.006)
Years of education 0.040*** 0.024*** 0.043***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.011)
No. of children less than 3 yrs old -0.732*** -0.423*** -0.814***
(0.016) (0.009) (0.054)
Region of residence: North 0.026 0.015 0.284**
(0.018) (0.011) (0.135)
Region of residence: Center 0.255*** 0.151*** 0.564***
(0.020) (0.012) (0.146)
French nationality 0.452*** 0.257*** 0.150
(0.030) (0.017) (0.158)
Owner of real estate 0.226*** 0.136*** 0.238**
(0.013) (0.007) (0.093)
Lower manager -0.275** -0.182*** -0.559
(0.117) (0.070) (0.967)
Salaried worker 0.296*** 0.173*** -0.972***
(0.034) (0.020) (0.110)
Skilled worker 0.212*** 0.126*** -0.886***
(0.019) (0.012) (0.063)
Regional unemployment rate -0.012*** -0.007*** -0.039
(0.004) (0.002) (0.027)
Registered to the ANPE -0.153*** -0.081*** -0.166***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.047)
Inflow after employment 1.306*** 0.787*** 1.133***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.033)
Spouse’s unemployment duration NO YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Panel fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Log likelihood -106404.19 -86998.436 -86902.342 -27365.352
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Duration Model With Endogeneity Correction
Husbands, Coefficients Wives, Coefficients
Spouses’ log hourly wage 0.378*** -0.154***
(0.084) (0.043)
Controls as in (2) - (4) YES YES
Rho -0.055 -0.030
(0.018) (0.010)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 10: Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) IV
Wives’ log(hourly wage) 0.024*** 0.065*** 0.062*** 0.518*** 0.378***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.163) (0.084)
Husbands’ log(hourly wage) -0.013*** -0.074*** -0.072*** -0.317* -0.154***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.181) (0.043)
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table 11: Panel Married Men And Women - Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 = Woman -0.129** 0.183** 0.111** 0.445***
(0.064) (0.074) (0.044) (0.157)
(1=Woman)*log(hourly wage) -0.229*** -0.379*** -0.228*** -0.840***
(0.033) (0.039) (0.023) (0.081)
log(hourly wage) 0.151*** 0.159*** 0.095*** 0.669***
(0.028) (0.034) (0.021) (0.060)
Controls NO YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 12: Panel Married Men And Women - Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 = Woman -0.031** 0.043** 0.042** 0.445***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.157)
(1=Woman)*log(hourly wage) -0.055*** -0.089*** -0.087*** -0.840***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.081)
log(hourly wage) 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.669***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.060)
Controls NO YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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C Variables
In this Appendix I provide details of the computation of the variables used in the
empirical analysis. Each agent is identified by the variables AIRE, IMLOC, NOI,
and S (sex).
Log(Spouse’s hourly wage): monthly earnings are computed from the variables
SALRED and (SALFR + PRIMFR*(1/12)) when SALRED is not available. The
amounts are deflated using the consumer price deflator available at the web site
of the INSEE11. Weekly hours worked are imputed from DUHAB, and replaced by
the average weekly hours worked by men and women if DUHAB is not available
but the reported wage is positive. In the cases in which the hourly wage is not
higher than the minimum legal wage of that year, the hourly wage considered is the
latter. See Table 5 for details on the minimum legal hourly wage, or salaire minimum
interprofessionnel de croissance (SMIC).
Age: the variable is AG.
Years of education: the variable DIPL1 is recoded to get the average number of
years spent in school.
No. of children less than 3 yrs old: the variable is ENF3.
Region of residence: the variable RG is split in three more variables that I
named North, Center, and South. The north of France includes the following re-
gions: Picardie, Haute-Normandie, Nord-Pas de Calais, Champagne-Ardennes, Lor-
raine, Alsace, Ile-de-France, Basse-Normandie. Center includes: Pays de la Loire,
Bretagne, Centre, Bourgogne, Franche-Comte´, Poitou-Charentes, Limousin, Rhoˆne-
Alpes, Auvergne. South includes: Languedoc-Roussillon, Provence-Cte d’Azur-
Corse, Aquitaine, Midi-Pyre´ne´es.
French nationality: the variable is N.
Owner of real estate: the variable is SO.
Occupation: the variable DCSTOT is used to distinguish four type of occupations
as described above.
Regional unemployment rate: data available at the INSEE web site12.
Registered to the ANPE: the variable is ANPE, and indicates the registration to
the “Agence nationale pour l’emploi”.
Inflow after permanent employment, temporary employment, school or
military: the variable is FI recorded at the month which precedes the unemployment
spell.
11http : //www.insee.fr/fr/themes/conjoncture/historiqueipc.asp
12http : //www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?regid = 99refid = CMRSOS03311
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Spouse’s unemployment duration: After matching the couples, I sum up the
number of months where the spouse has declared to be unemployed. I distinguish
between several states: never unemployed; unemployed for less than 6 months; un-
employed for less than 12 but more than 6; unemployed for less than 18 but more
than 12 months; unemployed for less than 24 but more than 18 months; unemployed
for less than 30 but more than 24 months; unemployed for more than 30 months.
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